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Forensic Project Management: An Exploratory
Examination of the Causal Behavior
of Design-Induced Rework
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Abstract—The determination as to why projects fail to meet
planned schedule, cost, and quality parameters is a leitmotiv within
the construction, engineering, and project management literature.
Yet, the interrelatedness and behavior of key factors that influ-
ence these project performance indicators, particularly regarding
design-error-induced rework, have received limited academic ex-
amination. Design-induced rework has been reported to contribute
more than 70% of the total amount of rework experienced in con-
struction and engineering projects. To address this situation, a
forensic management approach to determining how and why re-
work occurred in a commercial construction project is undertaken.
Using findings from this case study along with knowledge from
the literature, a systemic causal model for design-error-induced
rework is developed. Underlying behavioral dynamics that con-
tributed to design errors (principally related to the management
of the design documentation process) were modeled and simulated
using system dynamics. The results of such an analysis yield in-
sights about architectural and engineering professionals’ decision-
making and work practices that can influence the occurrence of
design errors. The mitigation of design-induced errors would sig-
nificantly reduce the amount of rework that architectural and en-
gineering firms experience. This would bring with it greater prof-
itability for such firms and improved project performance param-
eters (schedule, cost, and quality).
Index Terms—Design, errors, learning, rework, system
dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
D ESIGN-INDUCED rework has been found to contributeto 70% of the total amount of rework that is incurred
in projects [13], [42]. Having to unnecessarily repeat activities
or processes that were incorrectly implemented the first time
within a project can adversely affect the profitability, perfor-
mance, and reputation of those organization(s) involved; as well
as a project’s organizational and social fabric [46]. This is par-
ticularly the case in construction projects, where rework, which
invariably results from design errors or design changes (e.g.,
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client-initiated), has been acknowledged as being the primary
factor contributing to time and cost overruns [43]. Such design
changes are a frequent occurrence within construction [18], [32].
They can generate costly ripple effects leading to delay and dis-
ruption throughout the entire project supply chain [3].
Projects may often appear to be going smoothly until near-
ing completion, when errors made during their formative stages
are discovered necessitating costly rework [17], [27], [43], [75].
Of more importance is that design errors, if undetected, may
lead to civil, geotechnical, or structural failures, which can have
catastrophic consequences including severe injuries and even
fatalities [11], [12], [14], [24], [52], [68]. “High-profile” con-
struction and engineering failures that have led to fatalities in-
clude the Tay Bridge, Teton Dam, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl,
West Gate Bridge, Kansas Hyatt Regency, and more recently,
the Paris Charles de Gaulle International Airport [7], [29], [38],
[59], [62], [68].
Such occurrence of catastrophic failure typically triggers a
forensic investigation of engineering and management practices,
not least to determine how and why the event happened and what
could have been done to prevent it. The information obtained
from a forensic investigation can be used to stimulate learning
and guide future decision or policy-making, as well as initiating
process improvement activities. However, forensic investiga-
tions rarely take place when the project failures do not make
headlines (inasmuch as they are far less dramatic); although
even these “minor” failures tend to result in productivity losses,
cost and schedule overruns, and contractual claims. Even when
a project is deemed to be successful, the likelihood of design
errors and rework occurring is very high, and so forensic exam-
inations are still needed to be undertaken if performance is to
be improved.
Notwithstanding widespread availability of lessons learned
from project failures and successes and resulting technological
advancements, design errors still continue to plague construc-
tion projects. This is because many design and construction or-
ganizations often focus on “preparing the next bid and project,”
and as such, do not allocate adequate time for reflection, which
is a critical part of any learning process [49]. Moreover, the in-
creasing cost and schedule demands being imposed by clients on
architectural and engineering (design) consultants, often results
in limited attention being given to design verification and review
processes [45]. One school of thought regarding the latter is that
this is a symptom of procuring professional services through
competitive bidding [19]; which often results in clients encoun-
tering incomplete (or erroneous) design-related documentation.
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This may then be issued to contractors as a basis upon which to
compile their tenders. Typically, the errors contained within such
documentation are not detected until operations begin on-site
and, as a result, they adversely impact the management, plan-
ning, and procurement of the project. Furthermore, design errors
can contribute to engineering and plant operator reliability prob-
lems, which have been found to adversely impact safety [34].
To investigate these problems of “design-induced rework,”
this paper presents a forensic management approach, based upon
the methodology of system dynamics, to determine how and
why rework occurred in a commercial construction project. The
key factors that contribute to design-error-induced rework are
identified from a review of the normative literature and used to
produce an influence diagram, which is used as the basis for
examining rework in a case study project. The findings from the
case study project are used to modify the proposed influence
diagram and produce a causal model of design-error-induced
rework. The key issues identified from the case study are then
modeled and simulated to gain an understanding of the complex
interactions and consequences of rework. Mitigation of design-
induced errors will reduce the amount of rework that design
firms experience, and thus, improve their overall profitability
and the performance of the projects that they are involved with.
II. ERROR-INDUCED REWORK IN PROJECTS
A. System Dynamics and Forensic Project Management
System dynamics is an appropriate modeling technique
for analyzing or managing complex processes, which involve
changes over time and are dependent on the feedback, trans-
mission, and receipt of information [62]. System dynamics is
defined as “a rigorous method for qualitative description, explo-
ration, and analysis of complex systems in terms of their pro-
cesses, information, organizational boundaries, and strategies;
which facilitates quantitative simulation modeling and analysis
for the design of system structure and behavior” [77]. System
dynamics also “offers a rigorous method for the description, ex-
ploration, and analysis of complex project systems comprised of
organizational elements, the project work packages and environ-
mental influences” [65]. The method has been used as a project
postmortem diagnosis tool [16], [76]. Consequently, and in this
specific context, it can be used to provide managers with the
necessary insights about the interdependencies and behavior be-
tween key variables that can contribute to rework so that learning
and process improvements can be made to future projects [17].
Within this paper, the term forensic project management is
coined to denote “the activity of determining the causal mech-
anisms that contribute to unsatisfactory project performance
related to error-induced rework.” The term forensic has a le-
gal connotation relating to science used in the investigation and
establishment of facts or evidence in a court of law. System
dynamics has been used on several occasions to support le-
gal proceedings with respect to delays and disruption claims in
projects [3], [16]. For the purposes of this paper, the term foren-
sic should be perceived as a nonlegal investigative procedure.
Construction projects are extremely dynamic and complex
and consist of multiple interdependent “components,” which
have multiple interacting feedback processes, and numerous
nonlinear relationships [69]. In addition, they are essentially
“human” enterprises, and cannot therefore, be fully understood
(or conveniently represented) solely in terms of technical rela-
tionships among these components. Most of those data needed
to understand the evolution and dynamics of design manage-
ment problems (that are experienced in projects) are primarily
concerned with managerial decision-making and other so-called
“soft” variables. This characteristic in itself contributes to the
complex nature of the problem at hand [54]. As an analysis
tool, system dynamics has been used to model a wide range of
construction and engineering issues, for example:
1) client and project management relationships [36];
2) civil engineering contracting work [67];
3) delays and disruption [3], [27];
4) the design process of engineering [54];
5) the impact of change orders and rework [40], [43];
6) the effects of initial scope on project performance [20];
7) dynamic planning for fast tracking projects [57]; and
8) the cost and time performance of design and build projects
[21].
Only limited research has examined the behavior and under-
lying causes of design-error-induced rework in construction and
engineering projects [4], [46]. In fact, the underlying manage-
rial and organizational process that causes errors has not been
systematically examined [62]. By using system dynamics, the
behavioral characteristics associated with the production of re-
work and its impact on project performance can be assessed.
B. Management and Organization: Design Errors
Errors are unintended deviations from correct and acceptable
practice, and thus, are avoidable [37]. While errors are deemed
to be avoidable, it is a matter of contention whether individuals
can justifiably be blamed for all errors, as making mistakes is
an innate characteristic of human nature [38], [61].
1) Skill Base and Experience: There are three types of hu-
man errors [37]; errors due to poor knowledge, errors due to
carelessness and negligence, and errors of intent (i.e., due to
greed). Poor knowledge is often a result of insufficient educa-
tion and training, and experience. Carelessness and negligence
include errors in calculations and detailing, and incorrect read-
ing of drawings and specifications. These are errors of exe-
cution and are a result of lack of due diligence. Regardless
of the skill level, experience, or training that individuals pos-
sess, errors may be made at any time during a project’s life
cycle [6], [31], [47], [55], [73].
Fig. 1 presents an influence diagram that identifies key is-
sues from the literature in the design phase (i.e., conceptual,
schematic, and detailed design) that can influence a designer’s
cognitive reasoning, and therefore, their likelihood to com-
mit errors [8], [61]. Other factors, such as ineffective use of
computer-aided design [25], low task awareness, overload, fa-
tigue and stress, lack of teamwork, lack of awareness of changes
in standards, and not knowing what is required are also factors
that can contribute to designers making errors [4]. During the
construction phase of a project, effort and time is expended in
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Fig. 1. Influence diagram of design-error-induced rework.
attempting to identify and correct the specific design errors that
have occurred. When there is pressure to complete a project or
activities, then some tasks will be completed erroneously and
there will invariably be a time delay before they are identified.
The processes that generated the error(s) may also continue to
create additional problems that appear later, and therefore, may
have a significant effect on project schedule as well as the morale
and motivation of the project team.
2) Client and End-User Requirements: Generally, design-
change-induced rework is client-initiated and invariably results
in a modification to the contract, where the resultant impact
on cost and time are mutually agreed upon by the client and
contractor [78]. Another aspect is not understanding the client’s
requirements, and subsequently, commencing the process of
design without communicating to the client their intentions or
interpretation of what they or end-users require. Noteworthy,
different client types with varying experiences can influence the
effectiveness of the communication process with their design-
ers, especially when buildings are commissioned by clients who
are not themselves the users of the facility. Frequently, commu-
nication between designers and the end-user of the facility is
indirect, and as such, tends to be filtered by organizational poli-
tics [39]. In some cases, a client’s representative may attempt to
act as a communication channel between the design team and
end-users in order to drive through issues or maintain a pow-
erful position in the system. While this may provide the client
with increased control over the design team, it can also serve
to make their task of understanding the problem more difficult.
Even if such barriers do not exist between the client and design
team, communication gaps still tend to exist between the design
team and client with end-users [41], [88]. Love and Li [42], for
example, found changes during construction initiated by end-
users can account for up to 25% of rework costs that occur in
a project. There can be instances, however, where design team
members are the source of an error and a design change is later
required when the error is detected during construction [41].
Previous examples have shown design errors to have accounted
for 30% [1] and 38% [74] of rework in a water treatment and
industrial engineering project, respectively.
3) Schedule Pressure, Design Fees, and Planning During
Design: Design is a complex, challenging, and creative process
that is often driven by personal motivation coupled with the
desire to satisfy client needs [39]. Moreover, it is a specialized
and highly demanding form of problem solving [57], [60]. The
“personal” need to satisfy creative desire is restrained within the
confines of what is possible in the architectural and engineering
process [30]; and of course, by economic constraint. Set against
the general aim of achieving a functional design solution, in-
novation, and high quality is the continuos pressure to meet
the immediate needs of clients; these principally being cost and
time parameters.
An unrealistic client demand for earlier completion of projects
has been found to be a factor that contributes to the production
of incomplete and erroneous contractdocumentation [71], [72].
Lack of attention to management and providing a poor quality
service by design consultants has resulted in rework becoming
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a norm and profits being eroded within architectural firms [41].
Contract documentation quality may be compromised when a
firm submits a low design fee for a project, especially when
design tasks are subject to “time boxing.” That is, a fixed period
of time may be allocated to complete each task, irrespective of
whether the documentation or each individual task is complete
or not. Poor workload planning within design organizations can
also contribute to “time boxing” and result in inadequate time to
prepare complete design documents. The use of inexperienced
staff that possess limited technical knowledge may lead to errors
and omissions in contract documentation being made. Findings
resulting from a study on the technical design of buildings found
that the most frequent causes of severe deviations during design
were attributable to deficient planning and/or resource alloca-
tion, and deficient or missing input and changes [72].
4) Design Checks, Audits, and Reviews: Prior behavior can
have an impact on the choices that an individual makes. Once
an individual has learned that a particular behavior provides a
viable solution to a decision problem, the learned behavior is
likely to be repeated when a similar situation arises [35]. When
subjected to time pressures, individuals will tend to maintain
their routine when reencountering the same choice problem,
even after having formed the intention to choose an alternative
behavior. In some circumstances, individuals may decide to
deviate from their routine behavior [9]. For instance, if routine
behavior repeatedly produces negative outcomes, the individual
may decide to purse an alternative course of action in their future
problem solving [10]. Though, an individual’s knowledge is
typically limited to their own activities, which can contribute to
their inability to detect errors [47].
Once construction has commenced, the financial and time
implications of rectifying errors can be considerable once they
have been identified. Invariably, there will be a number of tasks
completed during design erroneously. This is because design
firms tend to negate implementing rigid quality management
practices, such as checking and auditing [45], [66], [72]. While
the effectiveness of checking and inspecting design details and
specification has been advocated as a mechanism to detect er-
rors [70], the process of checking itself tends to be intermittent,
and as a result, all errors cannot be expected to be identified [37].
Furthermore, individuals checking a design for errors invari-
ably make the same mistakes as the original perpetrators [59].
The process of checking may become more arduous when de-
sign activities, such as architectural, mechanical, and structural
engineering, are subjected to concurrency (degree of overlap
between activities), otherwise known as parallelism [76]. In
other words, as tasks are performed concurrently, the number
of interactions increases and the likelihood for errors to occur
also increases. Noteworthy, there is a limit to the number of
tasks that can be undertaken in a concurrent manner [33]. Be-
yond this specified limit, the probability of rework occurring
as well as time and cost overruns being experienced signifi-
cantly increases. This is exacerbated when the design team is
under pressure due to schedule slippages as a result of occur-
rence of errors or change orders being undertaken. As a result
of this pressure on design team members, more errors may be
made. According to Cooper [17], construction projects can take
as much as two and half cycles to rectify rework activities in
construction projects. Acknowledging that there will be design
errors committed, it is then the role of the Project Manager to
ensure that error detection mechanisms are in place. A more
detailed review of rework causes in construction projects can be
found in Love et al. [46].
III. RESEARCH APPROACH
To determine the causal variables of design-induced rework,
the traditional scientific concept of causality founded on the
monocausal model in the physical and biological sciences is
subject to subtle changes, and adapted to a social context as con-
struction projects are essentially complex social systems [51].
In this instance, causality is not considered to be linear, pro-
portional, or incremental, but multidimensional, whereby each
factor is interrelated and multicausal in nature. Furthermore, ra-
tional assumptions underlying the decision-making process are
not a presiding factor in explaining the nature and performance
of projects [48]. The assumption that decisions cause action and
that decisions occur before actions has been the subject of debate
and is questionable [15], [22]. That is, decisions can be made
after actions, and therefore, in some ways, made to legitimize
them [48].
An alternative to the bounded rationality of the decision-
making perspective is the action-orientated approach [23],
which views organizational performance as a chain of disparate
actions that need to be understood if developments in an orga-
nizational setting are to be explained [48]. The need to perform
specific actions to achieve immediate goals is the underlying ra-
tionale for the existence of a project [56]. When errors are iden-
tified, goals may be prone to subtle shifts, which may disrupt
the transitioning of tasks and impact the project’s performance.
Errors by their very nature are actionable events, and so prop-
agating knowledge about why and how they occur can used to
contribute to the contextual development of project management
theory.
The boundaries for the case study were defined as correspond-
ing to the construction period on-site. This was because of the
immediate availability of the project to the researchers. The
boundaries of the project were also taken to include only those
individuals, who were most directly involved in the project. In
essence, these individuals act as primary informants for rework
determinants. In many cases, the focal project team is read-
ily identifiable inasmuch as they are required to be involved
throughout the postcontract phase of a project, especially under
a traditional lump contract.
Errors that had been made during the design phase remained
in a state of incubation until their identification (most usually as
“problems”) during construction. Once identified, an investiga-
tion as to how and why these errors occurred was undertaken.
The case study project was selected because of its availabil-
ity and because the participating organizations were willing to
participate at the time the research was to commence.
A. Data Collection
The researchers acted as nonparticipant observers throughout
the duration of the data collection process on-site. Data was
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TABLE I
COST INCREASES INCURRED IN THE PROJECT
collected from the date on which construction commenced on-
site to the date of practical completion. The site was visited
between one and three times a week throughout the duration of
the project and each visit lasted between 2 and 5 h. The time al-
located for collating rework data varied because during the early
stages of the project there were very few incidents reported or
identified by the contractor’s project manager. Two block vis-
its of 4 days were also conducted to coincide with a period
of increased site activity. The researchers acted as observers,
and at times, relied on their industry experience to identify re-
work events that occurred while reading through the contract
documentation (i.e., site instructions, change order requests, re-
quests for information, drawing changes, etc.), which was stored
in the main site offices. However, before any event was catego-
rized as rework, its validation was sought from the contractor’s
project manager, site foreman, and contract’s administrator. Ev-
ery attempt was made not to disrupt the workflow of the site
management team and subcontractors.
The research relied on reports of individuals’ historical events
that are open to biases to do with recall and self-presentation.
Independent verification of the inferences made from inter-
viewees was made. Multiple sources were used to triangulate
these data so as to obtain a balanced view of the problem at
hand [64]. Triangulation was used to cross check for internal
consistency and reliability, and to test the degree of external
validity of the data. Documentation provided by the contractor
and unstructured interviews with project team members (e.g.,
architect, structural/mechanical/electrical engineers, site man-
agement team, and subcontractors) were the primary sources of
information for determining the causes and the costs of rework
that were experienced. A total of 130 interviews with the client’s
representative/project manager, design consultants, the contrac-
tor, subcontractors, and end-users, which ranged from 20 to
90 min in duration, were undertaken during the project’s con-
struction phase. Once a rework event was identified, then all
parties involved with identification and rectification were inter-
viewed so a balanced view of the event could be established
(Appendix B). Data derived from the interviews were tran-
scribed and then given to the interviewee to check for any dis-
crepancies that may have arisen. Data was then analyzed using
content analysis software QSR N5 and coded according to the
rework classification system presented in Love and Li [42].
B. Case Study Background
The project consisted of two residential blocks of six-storeys
each, which combined comprised 43 units. An underground
car parking, a landscaped podium, and a swimming pool were
among the facilities incorporated into this development. The
project had a contract value of A$10.96 million, a contract pe-
riod of 43 weeks, and was procured under a traditional lump ar-
rangement. A 5-week extension time was granted. The project
was issued with a certificate of practical completion 8 weeks
ahead of the rescheduled completion date. While the project
was delivered ahead of time, cost overruns were experienced
due to change orders and rework (Table I).
There was a direct cost overrun of an additional 10.5% (A$1
105 900) of the original contract value. Change orders as result
of additions initiated by the client and occupiers accounted for
7.35% (A$806 356) and 3.15% (A$345 504) were a direct result
of rework. Design changes and errors that resulted in rework
accounted for 2.7% (A$299 544) of the original contract value.
The remaining 0.45% (A$45 960) of rework costs were due to
minor defects.
Despite the cost overrun, the client and contractor’s project
manager considered the project a success, and mainly attributed
this to a dedicated and proactive site management team and
well-managed interorganizational relations with subcontractors.
In particular, the contractor’s site management team had worked
together on previous projects, which contributed to their overall
effectiveness and efficiency. Essentially, the team established a
flexible network of relationships, which was used to accomplish
tasks. The project manager had over 30 years of experience in
the local industry, with several years as an experienced carpenter
and foreman prior to joining the contracting firm. Many of the
subcontractors had previously worked with the project manager,
and thus, had developed good working relationships.
The design consultants, with the exception of the quantity
surveyor who was ambivalent about the project’s success or
failure, considered the project to be a success for the client and
occupier, but not from their organization’s point of view: they
simply did not make any profit because resources had to be
used to rectify design errors that had been made in the contract
documentation.
C. Causal Behavior of Design-Induced Rework
While the rework cost experienced in this case study is con-
siderably lower than those reported in other studies [13], [28],
[43], [53], [74], the design consultants and subcontractors (e.g.,
structural steel and ceiling and partitions) expressed a great deal
of dissatisfaction with its occurrence. Extensive changes were
required to their original scope of work due to design errors
that were contained in the contract documentation. Even though
the project was delivered ahead of schedule, the fact remained
that a significant cost overrun was experienced, of which 42%
was attributable to rework. This is comparable with the research
undertaken by Love [43] who found, on average, that rework
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Fig. 2. Causal loop diagram of design-error-induced rework.
contributed 52% of a project’s total cost overrun. No single cause
for a design error could be identified from the analysis, and in
many instances, the events that did occur were interconnected
with one another. Building on the influence diagram presented
in Fig. 1 and antecedents that will be presented next, a systemic
model of the interrelationships between the key factors that were
found to influence design-induced rework from the case study
findings was developed (see Fig. 2).
1) Client Requirements: Understanding client requirements
is pivotal to project success. The communication of these re-
quirements to the design team during the concept and detailed
design stages was the responsibility of the client’s project man-
ager. Such communication occurred in a piecemeal fashion and
limited attention was given to the design management inter-
face (e.g., design coordination meetings). This less than optimal
situation was further exacerbated by the late appointment of
the design engineers (structural, mechanical, electrical, and hy-
draulics), which meant that the architect had designed and began
documenting the project before the engineers could offer their
specialist input. Resultantly, the service engineering consultants
had to compromise their design of the project’s services (i.e.,
to accommodate the completed architectural design). A spe-
cific example is that the architect specified the floor to soffit
height of the basement slab to be 2.1 m. While this clearance
did correspond with the minimum requirements of the building
code, no allowance had been made for the inclusion of basement
hydraulics (storm water and sewer drainage).
2) Design Interface Management: The client’s project man-
ager had limited experience and knowledge of residential devel-
opments, because they had only been involved with project man-
agement of small industrial projects. Additionally, the client’s
project manager neglected to acknowledge that when a task is
process dependent, effective coordination of information flow
between subunits is critical. This lack of design coordination,
particularly between the architect and structural engineer during
the design process, meant that both consultants lost sight of their
respective roles in the project, and instead, concentrated on their
own objectives and goals. The architectural and structural and
drawings did not correspond with one another and contained an
excess amount of errors, which were only detected on-site by
the contractor. The noninteraction between key project partic-
ipants resulted in the contractor’s project manager making the
following comment:
You wouldn’t believe that they were working on the same project.
The architectural drawings were incomplete, and the pitch of the
roof was too steep, which meant that the building exceeded the
height stipulated by Brisbane City Council.
Problems that were identified by the contractor were passed
on to the client’s project manager, who then informed the archi-
tect and structural engineer of the issues to be addressed. The
relatively fixed “power structure” established by the contract
meant the contractor was suppressed from directly contacting
the architect and structural engineer, for example, to request
further information. Any requests for information (RFIs) that
were raised by the contractor and their subcontractors about
design errors had to be sent directly to the client’s project man-
ager, who then distributed the RFIs to the respective party.
This caused a bottleneck in the flow of information and con-
tributed to less attention being given to coordination by the
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client’s project manager. Even more surprising was that the RFIs
were not immediately forwarded to the architect and engineer,
which resulted in periods of inactivity being experienced by the
contractor.
The architect and engineering consultants did not have com-
patible software tools, which contributed to coordination issues
and made checking, when it did occur, a nebulous task. Clearly,
the use of a convenient and common platform for information
exchange and storage could have significantly reduced their time
to update and modify contract drawings.
3) Schedule Pressure and Fees: The architect and engineer-
ing consultants were quality assured to ISO 9000; however, lim-
ited checks in the form of design verification and reviews were
undertaken prior to documentation leaving their respective of-
fices. Both the architect and engineers stated that the design
program they had been given by the client’s project manager
was unrealistic. In fact, adequate resources were unavailable to
sufficiently complete the detailed design as their original fee
was based on the concept brief and only a certain number of
hours per week were to be allocated to the project. The de-
sign consultants did not realize the full extent of the work to
be undertaken at the time they tendered their services for the
project. This resulted mainly because the brief given to them
was evolving simultaneously with the design.
Although most design consultants will deny their use of “time
boxing,” it was revealed, albeit in informal discussions, that this
practice was resorted to by the design firms. The practice of time
boxing is used to allocate a fixed time to complete the contract
documentation, as a means of controlling resource expenditure.
Such actions almost always result in errors, especially when
there is schedule pressure from the client. While those designers
interviewed acknowledged that this practice was unprofessional,
they “hoped” that their designs would be adequate and that any
errors identified by the contractor would be straightforward to
address. Furthermore, graduates rather than more senior archi-
tects were used for contract documentation, as a further means
of reducing design costs.
4) Fatigue and Stress: Due to schedule pressure and the ne-
cessity to maximize their fee, the design consultants were sub-
jected to increasing job demands (i.e., working fast and hard,
having a great deal to do, not having enough time, and hav-
ing conflicting demands) as errors were identified. The fast
work pace of the project imposed physical requirements on
the project team, which invariably resulted in physical fatigue
being experienced. For example, the anxiety associated with the
need to maintain the pace of work and associated consequences
of failing to complete work, contributed to the project architect
becoming demotivated and experiencing a high degree of stress.
As a result, the architect had to go on sick leave for a month, at a
time when a number of critical design errors had to be rectified.
During this period, additional staff were supplied to the project
to address the errors and other queries that arose. Because these
staff had limited knowledge of the project’s internal dynamics,
particularly the issues associated with the design and the status
of its completeness, there was a degree of reluctance to fully im-
merse them into solving the incomplete work. There was simply
no motivation to take on erroroneous work.
IV. MODELING KEY BEHAVIORAL DYNAMICS
The causal loop diagram presented in Fig. 2 was subjected
to validation by six industry practitioners (two each of archi-
tects, structural, and mechanical engineers) using unstructured
interviews. Each of these interviews was approximately 1 h in
duration. The factors identified and their respective relation-
ships were considered by these practitioners as representative
of practice.
The case study findings revealed the underlying behavioral
dynamics that contributed to design errors related to the man-
agement of the design documentation process. This was also
confirmed by the practitioners during the evaluation process of
the causal loop diagram. In addition, the process associated with
the production of design documentation is also considered to be
problematic in Australia [72], and therefore, this process was
chosen to be modeled and simulated in this study.
Key aspects associated with the management of the design
process are the: process of inducting and recruiting design per-
sonnel, process of design tasks, degree of error proneness (i.e.,
the capacity of design personnel to make errors), and redesign-
ing previously completed tasks [2]. Each of these aspects is now
discussed in more detail.
1) Inducting and Recruiting Design Personnel: Typically, the
composition of personnel within a design firm will vary with
the firm’s size and workload. There are, however, three differ-
ent classifications of designer: experienced; newly recruited;
and inducted (i.e., an experienced designer working on other
projects within the design firm but seconded to a new project).
The productivity and accuracy of tasks undertaken during the
design process will vary from one classification of designer
to another [2], [14]. When determining staffing levels within
a design office, one would reasonably assume that the part-
ner(s)/office manager takes a rational approach to selecting and
recruiting new staff. Therefore, based on their design schedule,
the partner(s)/office manager will determine the number of de-
signers needed for a project and then compare this requirement
with those designers who are available. Any difference between
the number of designers needed and those available is referred
to as the shortfall (not enough) or surplus (more available than
needed). If there is a shortfall, the partner/office manager may
decide to either recruit additional staff or internally induct staff.
In either case, the new designer(s) will have to become famil-
iar with the project’s characteristics, requirements, and history.
Consequently, a delay (or reduction in productivity) is experi-
enced before they become knowledgeable about the project, and
thus, can be classified as an “experienced designer.”
2) Process of Designing Tasks: Design tasks are assigned
among the three different groups of designers (referred to ear-
lier). There are two possible design outcomes from the design
groups–the design is completed correctly or it is not. Depending
on the error proneness of the designer (that is, the capacity of the
designer to make mistakes), the number of correctly designed
tasks can be approximated (although this approximation will
always be prone to variance). For the purposes of modeling, the
number of tasks designed correctly and incorrectly by each of
the three classifications of designer will be identified (see the
following paragraphs).
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3) Error Proneness During Design: The factors that con-
tribute to error proneness are parallelism, schedule pressure,
and design fee pressure. These contributing factors have been
confirmed from the case study findings and the literature. The
authors have assumed that the identified designer types will
each be subject to different degrees of error proneness [2], [14].
Therefore, a nominal value for committing errors is assumed
in the model, as shown in Table I. This error value is deemed
to rise due to any combination of: schedule pressure increases,
when design fees are low; and when the degree of parallelism
between design tasks increases. Low salaries can act as demo-
tivators, which, in turn, may also contribute to the incidence of
errors. Similarly, when a firm submits a low design fee for a
project, it may “time box” tasks, which can increase pressure on
designers and encourage mistakes. Parallelism may bring with
it mistakes as discussed earlier.
4) Redesigning Design Tasks: Once the design and contract
documentation is complete, it is passed to the contractor to
price. At this point, the authors assume the contract has been let
to a selected main contractor and construction has commenced
on-site. As construction progresses, errors are inevitably found
in the contract documentation. Similarly, some elements of the
building may be constructed incorrectly. If an error is proved to
be the responsibility of the contractor (or a subcontractor), then
it may be rectified (rework) with no added cost to the client.
On the other hand, if the architect or engineer caused the error,
then they will be responsible for solving the problem. Unless it
is a simple problem, a particular item or selection of work may
need to be redesigned. The design firm may have to recall the
designer(s) responsible for that part of the design and documen-
tation process to undertake the necessary rework. If the original
designer(s) have left the firm, the process of recruiting/inducting
may well commence again. However, for the purpose of this pa-
per, the authors have assumed that the designer(s) can be readily
recalled to the project. It is assumed that as construction pro-
gresses on-site, errors in the contract documentation will be
identified by the contractor/subcontractors. As they are identi-
fied, the process of confirmation and redesigning of tasks will
commence.
A. Simulation Modeling
The mechanisms explained earlier have been expanded fur-
ther to develop a simulation model for analyzing error in de-
sign. The flow diagram presented in Appendix A details the
assumed parameters of the model with respect to the process of
inducting/recruiting design staff. A detailed discussion about the
formulation of the major equations used to develop the model
is beyond the scope of this paper, but they can be viewed in
Appendix B. Estimates for the model’s parameters (i.e., project
duration and contract value) were derived from the case study.
In addition, the industry practitioners provided estimates for de-
signer salaries, and design fees, which ranged from 5 to 10%
of project costs. In conjunction with industry practitioners, the
authors have determined the parameters used to model the influ-
ence of design errors. Table II identifies the data and assumptions
made in the model for generating a series of possible scenarios
TABLE II
DATA AND MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Fig. 3. Simulated completion of design tasks versus the actual schedule.
for a given project based on the findings derived from the case
study.
The process of model validation is multifaceted. The model
has been examined for structural validation inasmuch as the
major factors identified from the case study and literature have
been used and the values used in the model validated by industry
practitioners. The model is tested for behavior prediction so as
to assist practitioners with particular scenarios they may be
faced with. Fig. 3 depicts the model’s simulated behavior for
the time allocated for the design and documentation process, in
comparison to the actual design schedule.
For the example used in this paper, the model shows a sim-
ulated design completion time of 45 weeks (for the completion
of 95% activities) compared to a scheduled design completion
time of 40 weeks (Table I). Fig. 3 shows the behavior of actual
design activities completion against the forecasted schedule.
The actual progress always remained below the scheduled de-
sign activities. This is explained by the fact that the design firm
takes time to recruit and train design personnel. However, de-
sign firms often neglect this factor when planning their design
schedule for projects [54]. Fig. 4 exhibits the allocation of de-
sign staff during the documentation process, which identifies
that more design staff are allocated during the early stages of
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Fig. 4. Number of design staff required during the documentation process.
Fig. 5. Occurrence of errors during on-site operations.
the project. Similarly, the number of design staff decreases as
tasks are completed.
The actual effort (measured in person-weeks) in the docu-
mentation process is marginally above the estimated effort, that
is, 556 person-weeks against the target of 548 person-weeks. At
least 43 activities in total have been modeled and are designed
erroneously in this example. It is assumed that of these, 28 errors
are design-based, which are detected on-site, and therefore, have
to be redesigned. Fig. 5 shows the time-dependent behavior of
identified errors and their rectification.
The period for amending errors (redesigning of activities)
takes 14 person-weeks effort (refer to Table II). With a 40-week
period for documentation and 43-week construction period, the
simulation indicates that at the 105th week only 95% of activities
will be completed. “Time boxing” may occur at, or even before
this point is reached. The number of designers that need to be
recalled during construction for correcting errors was simulated
and calculated. Though, in practice, only a fraction of a single
designer’s time is utilized in correcting errors, over the whole
project the total redesign time was equivalent to one designer
working full time on correcting errors for 14 weeks.
B. Testing of Alternative Scenarios
To further understand the dynamics of design-error-induced
rework in a project system, the following scenarios were tested:
1) Scenario 1: Continue with the present situation.
2) Scenario 2: Reduce design time—Due to external pres-
sure, a project manager could accelerate the design and
documentation process of the project. For example, the
design schedule could be compressed from 40 weeks to
25 weeks. No other change is effected: Salary is $1000 per
person per week; available design personnel from other
projects are ten.
3) Scenario 3: Reduce design time with engagement of ex-
perienced design personnel—It is assumed that paying
an additional salary (in terms of overtime payments) will
be attractive to experienced design staff. The salary is
increased by 50% to A$1500 per person per week. The
scheduled design completion time is kept at 6 weeks.
4) Scenario 4: Recruit a high proportion of design personnel
from external sources—In the event of being awarded a
new contract, design firms in normal circumstances use
their existing personnel, as this may be less disruptive.
However, if there is a shortage of internal design staff, the
design firm may have to externally recruit design staff.
Reducing the number of available design staff from ten
to five can test this scenario. Salary is set at A$1000 per
person per week and the scheduled design completion time
is 6 weeks.
5) Scenario 5: A combined policy incorporating a design
fee reduction, short design delivery period, and reliance
on external supply of design personnel—Design fee is
reduced from 5% to 4% of project cost. Design completion
period is 25 weeks and the available design personnel from
internal sources are only 5.
In Scenario 2, the design schedule is reduced from 40 weeks
to 25 weeks. Consequently, this requires designers to raise their
productivity without an increase in salary, which may have a
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF SCENARIOS TESTED
demotivating consequence contributing to more errors being
made. In this scenario, the effort to design has risen by 5%
and the number of erroneously designed activities increased by
almost 100%. To complete the design activities in a shorter
period, the design firm may have to recruit a large number of
inexperienced personnel, but due to their high error proneness,
errors may increase. As a result, the number of redesigned ac-
tivities and the effort required would increase by 90% and 85%,
respectively, when compared to Scenario 1.
Scenario 3 appears to be a reasonable approach as a reduc-
tion in the design and documentation period would require the
design firm to pay higher salaries for better qualified person-
nel. The implications of implementing this scenario are that the
design and documentation period would be completed within
390 person-weeks and the required effort would be 30% less
than that in Scenario 1. The number of errors in both the initial
design and redesign stages is similar to that found in Scenario 1
(Table III).
The behavior observed in Scenario 4 is very similar to that
in Scenario 2. In Scenario 4, due to the lack of available in-
house design staff, the design firm could be compelled to recruit
inexperienced design staff from external sources. In effect, this
may increase the number of errors, and consequently, more effort
may be required during the design and documentation process.
Moreover, as errors occur, increased effort may be needed to
redo erroneous activities.
Scenario 5 may be considered to be the most inappropriate
policy. A reduction in the design fee from 5% to 4% as well
as a reduced design and documentation period may force the
design firm to produce contract documentation with minimum
enthusiasm and “time boxing,” which can lead to higher levels
of error being experienced.
The incidence of errors contained within contract documen-
tation produced by architectural and engineering consultants, is
considered to be alarmingly high in the Australian construction
industry [72]. While it has been implied that the use of com-
petitive tendering for professional services may have possibly
contributed to this incidence, the fact remains that design firms
need to adapt to the market conditions within which they op-
erate. In the United States, for example, the Brooks Act was
established as Federal law and implied that architects and engi-
neers be selected on the basis of their professional qualifications,
subject to negotiation of fair and reasonable compensation for
such services [19]. Significant cost savings have been achieved
for clients who have adopted the Brooks Act as a basis for
procuring architectural and engineering services. Yet, the im-
mediate challenge for the Australian construction industry is to
shift from a “price-dominant” market to one that focuses upon
quality-based selection. This will not only require a change in
attitude and behavior from clients, but will also require the archi-
tectural and engineering consulting firms to rethink their work
practices, and their approach to service delivery by putting the
customer first. Simply asking for higher fees for services may
reduce the incidence of errors in the short-term, but compla-
cency can soon set in and a return to “old” work practices can
be readily triggered by sudden shifts in market conditions.
There is always a danger that design-error-induced rework
will creep up and settle in at an insidiously comfortable level,
which may be accepted as an industry norm. If design con-
sultants repeatedly produce design-error-induced rework, they
may become invisible or come to be regarded, with compla-
cency, at the cost of doing business. What is, in fact, a chronic
malaise becomes “normal.” Whatever the percentage increase
that is taken up by rework, that percentage will be added to the
firm’s costs. So, if rework accounts for 10% of regular work of
a design firm (or any other type), this would lead to everything
being increased by 10%: supervision, cycle time for administra-
tive procedures, answering requests for information, and so on.
The time element obviously translates into costs, which are then
buried in what would be considered “normal” operating costs.
History suggests that those who fail to learn from their mis-
takes are invariably condemned to relive them again. Insight
gained from previous mistakes or oversights made in projects
can be gainfully employed in preventing their repetition in the
future. Learning from mistakes is a hard way to learn, but con-
tinuing to make the same mistakes is far harder and certainly
more costly. In a competitive environment such as construction,
embedded inefficiencies such as these may be the ultimate fail-
ure producing mechanism: in certain situations, mistakes can be
disastrous.
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Fig. 6. Flow diagram for the process of inducting/recruiting design staff.
V. CONCLUSION
The construction industry in countries such as Australia,
Hong Kong, Finland, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom have, and to a certain extent are going through
a period of introspection, as they aim to improve the perfor-
mance of the industry. It is widely acknowledged that time and
cost overruns of projects plague the industry and strategies for
improving project performance have been propagated. How-
ever, it has come to light in recent times that a major factor that
has contributed to the incidence of cost and time overruns is
rework, which typically manifests itself in the form of changes
and errors. In this paper, the issue of design errors was examined
and it was revealed that an array of factors contribute to their
incidence in construction projects. The pressures imposed upon
design firms from their clients to produce detailed design doc-
umentation can lead to errors being made, and as a result many
of which may not be identified until construction commences
on-site. The rework cycle that commences on identification of
the error adversely impacts the performance of the design firm
and the project. Some firms undertake design audits, design
verifications, and reviews before documentation is distributed
for tender, but this practice is not the norm, and there is ample
evidence that suggests the contrary.
Undertaking design reviews and verifications is the first step
to minimizing the potential impact of errors, but these prac-
tices will not prevent them from occurring. With this in mind,
consideration needs to be given to planning the design process
and making sure that resources are available to undertake the
required work. Selection of appropriate firms must be on the
actual skill level and experience of those staff that are actually
going to manage the project’s design process. In our previous
paper [46], a holistic procurement model to reduce the incidence
of rework in construction projects was propagated. In particular,
the proposed model encourages firms to embrace interorganiza-
tional collaboration and learning, and as such, requires them to
reexamine their work practices and methods in order to reduce
rework. If firms do not begin to reexamine their work practices,
then there is a danger that errors become a norm and adversely
impact on their overall profitability and the performance of the
projects that they are involved with. If design firms are to be
competitive in today’s environment, they should pay increas-
ing attention to effectively managing their human resources and
implementing quality management practices.
APPENDIX A
The flow diagram (Fig. 6) identifies the major levels and
rate variables associated with inducting and recruiting new and
experienced designers.
The actual number of required designers (Req_Desnrs)
is calculated based on an estimated number of designers
(Est_Reqd_Dgnrs) and a multiplier (Reqd_Dgnr_Mult), as
shown in (1). This multiplier is dependent on the percentage
of tasks that are to be designed, which is also dependent on the
size and complexity of the project, as shown in (2)
Req Desnrs = Est Reqd Dgnrs × Reqd Dgnr Mult (1)
Reqd Dgnr Mult = f (Perc Tasks to be Designed). (2)
The estimated number of designers depends on two factors:
the time available to complete the design tasks and estimated
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effort (in terms of design hours). Thus, if the scheduled time
for completing the design process were considered to be short,
then the estimated number of designers needed to complete the
firm’s requirements would be increased proportionally (3)
Est Reqd Dgnrs
= Estimated Effort / Sched Dgn Comp Time (3)
Estimated Effort = Design Fee / Dgnr Salary. (4)
Equation (4) assumes that the firm’s design fee (Design_Fee)
and the average salary of designers (Dgnr_Salary) determine the
estimated effort (Estimated_Effort) needed to conduct a series
of design tasks. The model is used to calculate the gap between
the required and actual number of designers employed at every
simulation interval. The model uses this information to deter-
mine whether or not designers need to be hired/inducted from
other projects (5)
DesnrsGap = Req Desnrs - Desnrs Present Inl Dgn (5)
Desnrs Present Inl Dgn = New Designers
+ Desnrs Other Proj + Exp Designers. (6)
Equation (6) assumes the actual number of designers
(Desnrs_Present_Inl_Dgn) equals the number of newly re-
cruited designers (New_Designers) plus the designers trans-
ferred from other projects (Desnrs_Other_Proj) plus the ex-
perienced designers (Exp_Designers). If the actual number of
designers were less than required, then there would be a need for
additional staff through recruitment or induction of existing de-
signers to the project. As mentioned earlier, designers are avail-
able from two sources: external recruitment, and the induction
of existing designers from other projects currently being under-
taken by the design firm. The number of new designers decreases
as they gain experience through the training/familiarization pro-
cess (7). For externally recruited/internally transferred design-
ers, there is a time period for recruiting/inducting (8)
d/dt(New Designers) = Desnrs Recr
− New Dgnrs Gng Exp
New Designers = 0 (initial value is 0) (7)
Desnrs Recr = (Desnrs Shortfall
− Desnr Pos Ind)/Time to Rec. (8)
The model allows a time period for the training or familiariza-
tion of designers. The model recognizes that there are different
time periods required for each of these designers, which, in turn,
affects its efficiency estimation.
APPENDIX B
The questions used for an interview were used to determine
the cause of a rework event. Identification and determination of
rework adopted the following process:
1) Identify the amount of rework being experienced on-site,
i.e., redesigns, nonconformances, etc. What effect has the
rework had on project cost and program?
2) Identify an event to be examined and gain an understand-
ing on the possible ramifications the event has had on
project participants. Informal conversations with the con-
tractor should provide an overview of the situation to be
studied.
3) Identify the project participants involved.
4) Contact each participant and ask for their assistance in the
research. Arrange a time to see them. Preferably when it
is convenient for them.
5) At the interview, explain the reason for the research,
specifically highlighting their importance. Briefly explain
the situation that you want the interviewee to talk about.
6) Ask the interviewee to list those events that occurred in
sequence.
7) Ask the interviewee to identify any unexpected events.
If particular unexpected events occurred, try asking the
following questions:
i) Why do you think this event(s) happened?
ii) Why do you think they were not predicted?
iii) Would it have been possible to predict them?
iv) If so, how should you have predicted them? And on
what basis?
8) If the interviewee suggests these events were unpre-
dictable, possibly ask the following questions:
9) Why were they unpredictable?
10) What do you see as the key problems that have arisen from
the project?
11) How do you think these problems have affected other
project participants?
12) List the problems. Then, ask the following questions for
each problem:
i) Could this problem have been prevented?
ii) Were any steps taken to prevent the rework before it
occurred?
iii) If so, what and by whom?
iv) Did the attempts to solve the problem fail or were
they partially successful?
v) In either case, why?
vi) Is there anything anyone else could have done that
would have solved/eliminated this problem? If so,
what? Whom? Why was it not done?
13) Conclude the interview by asking some general questions
and ask the interviewee for suggestion(s) on how might
the current situation been avoided.
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